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erkampft werden muBten, ohne deshalb nun 
im Ruckblick eine Anknupfung an Elemente 
der Tradition ausschlieBen zu mussen. So 
wird die westliche Geschichte zum ,,Beispie/ 
... mr Widerstande, MiBverstandnisse, Erfah-
rungen und Chancen im Ringen um den 
Schutz der MenschenwOrde unter den Bedin-
gungen der Moderne" (131 ). Einer kultures-
sentialistischen Vereinnahmung der Men-
schenrechte tur den westlichen Kulturkreis 
wird damit ebenso widersprochen wie einer 
Zuruckweisung der Menschenrechte im Na-
men eines traditionellen Ethos auf seiten etwa 
islamischer Staaten. Der menschenrechtliche 
Universalismus ware in beiden Fallen preis-
gegeben - und mil ihm der normative An-
spruch der Menschenrechtsidee an eine jeg-
liche Rechtsordnung. Diese aber kann, wie 
Bielefeldt im abermaligen Bezug auf Kant 
darlegt, ,,Legitimitat beanspruchen nur als 
konsequente Freiheitsordnung, die ihrerseits 
auf die Wurde des Menschen als sittlich au-
tonomes Subjekt verweist" {183). So sind die 
Literatur 
Menschenrechte zumal gegen theologische 
Begrundungsversuche als sakulares Recht zu 
behaupten, das nur a/ssolches auch die Frei-
heit der Religion zu gewahrleisten vermag 
(vgl. 184, 186, 188, 194). 
Die Erwartung eines ,,overlapping consen-
sus" in der Menschenrechtsdebatte durfte frei-
lich nicht nur im Blick auf das Thema ,,Recht 
und Religion" verfrOht sein. DaB deshalb 
gleichwohl nicht einem ,,Kampf der Kulturen" 
(Samuel P. Huntington) das Wort zu reden 
ist, dafOr liefert die vorliegende Untersuchung 
gute, bedenkenswerte GrOnde. So ist Biele-
feldts Philosophie der Menschenrechte, wie-
wohl in ihrer philosophischen Optik vielleicht 
etwas einseitig auf Kant fixiert, zweifellos ein 
Buch, das dem interkulturellen Menschen-
rechtsdiskurs wichtige AnstoBe zu geben ver-
spricht. 
Andreas GroBmann 
Dr. A. G., Dorotheenstr. 53, 22301 Hamburg 
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Guillaume Tusseau's book attracts attention 
for three reasons. First of all, it is a study of 
Jeremy Bentham's contested legal utilitaria-
nism. Secondly, it purports to examine, and 
partly reconstruct a dimension of Bentham's 
legal theory that is not as well known as 
others: his constitutional theory. And finally, 
the third reason is that the book is written in 
the French jurisprudential tradition being a 
revised version of a D.E.A. dissertation in le-
gal theory and philosophy of the University 
Paris X-Nanterre. But why Bentham, why con-
stitutional law and why in France? 
Why Bentham? His moral theory, espe-
cially his utilitarianism, have been discussed 
in depth over the past two centuries. Tus-
seau's point is not to revive controversies 
about Bentham's moral theory, but merely to 
"examine what can be a source of learning in 
Bentham's work on constitutional law".1 From 
the beginning the author even concedes that 
his approach to Bentham's work is founded 
on an "attitude of critical sympathy".2 
And why constitutional law? Bentham's 
jurisprudential writings are not as well-known 
as his essays in moral theory and even when 
they are, it is more for their insights into civil 
and criminal law than for constitutional law. 
Although he wrote more on the former, he also 
thought and wrote a lot on constitutional is-
sues. Such considerations may be found in 
the Fragment on Government or the Constt~ 
tutional Code, but they are also scattered in 
other essays. His writings on the declarations 
of fundamental rights, the separation of pow-
ers, electoral rules and political regimes are 
constitutive of a steady attempt to describe 
and account for what he himself delineated 
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as constitutional issues. Despite the impor-
tance of these considerations in Bentham's 
thought, only a few have been addressed in 
recent literature, either in France or else-
where. Moreover, a closer look has been giv-
en to those that are mainly related to political 
reform and not the more legal ones. Accord-
ing to Tusseau then, "a more complete and 
coherent presentation emphasizing the depth 
and explanatory value of Bentham's constitu-
tional theory is still a 'missing page' for a full 
understanding of Bentham's work.3" 
Such a comprehensive approach to 
Bentham's constitutional ideas is not only 
unprecedented, but also distinctive on account 
of. the major reconstructive work it required. 
Some of Bentham's writings on the issue have 
indeed only been released recently and have 
never actually been published as a coherent 
whole. In his efforts to reconstruct Bentham's 
constitutionalism, Tusseau spotlights ideas 
that are so original both for Bentham's time and 
for today's legal theory that they greatly enhance 
the book's intrinsic value. As the author explains, 
"the aim of the present study is not to seek the 
true interpretation of Bentham's thought, but 
focus on his ideas in order to shed a new light 
on their qualities and flaws and re-think the le-
gal phenomenon today."4 Of course, as the 
author warns, such a project is meant to be 
incomplete given the breadth and complexity 
of Bentham's legal theory.5 
Finally, why wrt~e a book on Bentham's 
constitutional theory in France ?French theo-
rists have not always been interested in 
Bentham's theory and, when they have, it was 
more in his moral theory. His legal theory then 
is still relatively unknown in France. A book 
was published on the question in 1970.6 Thir-
ty years later, the time has come to re-exam-
ine the validity of Bentham's thought for to-
day's legal theory, both in France and else-
where. This is precisely the task Tusseau has 
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set for himself in this book whose scope is 
therefore truly international. 
One of the book's essential characteris-
tics is its dualistic structure -in the purest 
French tradition. It starts with a preliminary 
chapter on the foundations of utilitarian juris-
prudenc~; in this chapter the author briefly 
summarizes the main tenets of Bentham's 
principle of utility, his theory of fictions his 
rejection of the social contract tradition ~nd, 
finally, his critique of natural law. This prelim-
inary chapter is followed by the book's two 
main parts: the first addresses Bentham's 
expository jurisprudence and the second his 
censorial jurisprudence. The first part entails 
two chapters: one on legal rules in general 
and another on the constitution itself. This 
second chapter encompasses considerations 
on the concept of constitutional law and on 
the constitutional limits to sovereignty. The sec-
ond part of the book, also in two chapters, ad-
dresses Bentham's censorial jurisprudence: first, 
his considerations on legal reform and, second, 
his ideas on constitutional politics. The first 
chapter has a first section on law's social func-
tions and a second one on Bentham's critique 
of English law. The second chapter on con-
stitutional politics is divided into two sections: 
one on democracy and the other on 
Bentham's utilitarian republicanism. 
So many interesting issues in Bentham's 
constitutional thought are raised in this book 
that it is not possible to do justice to them all 
in such a short review. I have therefore cho-
sen to concentrate on two interrelated issues: 
first of all, the fact that the constitution is a 
normative concept that has both a descrip-
tive and an evaluative component and, sec-
ondly, the constitution's socially constructed 
nature. 
Bentham's concept of constitutionalism 
entails both a descriptive and an evaluative 
dimension.7 In its descriptive component, it 
3 TUSSEAU, note 1, 20. This need is confirmed by the fact that a book on Bentham's constitutional 
thought was published in English at more or less the same time as Tusseau's: o. BEN-DOR Const1: 
tutional Limits and the Public Sphere. A Critical Study of Bentham's Constitutionalism Oxf~rd: Hart 
200~ • 
4 TUSSEAU, note 1, 24 
5 TUSSEAU, note 1, 277 
6 M. EL SHAKANKIRI, La philosophie juridique de Jeremy Bentham, Paris: LGDJ 1970 
7 I borrow this opposition between the descriptive and normative components of normative concepts 
from B'.WILLIAMS, Ethicsandthelimitsof Philosophy, London: Fontana Press 1985, 129, 141. For 
an a~plrcatlon to legal concept~, se~ J. WALDRON, Vagueness in Law and Language, Some Philo-
sophical Issues, (1994) 82 Califorma Law Rev1ew5091., 528 
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amounts to an integral part of Bentham's ex-
pository account of the legal system and its 
unified system of rules. Bentham even some-
times calls it the third branch of law after civil 
and criminal law.a The concept of constitu-
tionalism is also, however, a normative con-
cept. As such, it has an evaluative compo-
nent and its true meaning can only be deduced 
from the evaluation of its function and justifi-
cation and particularly its ability to create the 
greatest happiness of the greater number. 
Indeed, according to Bentham, a conception 
of law, and hence of constitutional law, can 
only be regarded as truly authoritative if it is 
the legislator's - if it is anyone else's, it will 
be taken as nothing other than a potentialcon-
ception, thus revealing the normative nature 
of the concept.9 
Tusseau refers to this duality of the con-
cept of constitutionalism by highlighting how 
well it fits into Bentham's dual system of ex-
pository and censorial jurisprudence and his 
unified account of jurisprudence as a whole.1 o 
For the purpose of exposition, the author sep-
arates those elements, 11 but it is important to 
remember that they belong together in an ef-
fort to offer a complete account of law and 
the constitution. It is in fact something Ron-
ald Dworkin emphasizes when he says that 
Bentham was the last legal positivist to offer 
a complete theory of law entailing both a de-
scriptive and a normative dimension. This 
specificity in Bentham's account has also led 
some authors, like Gerald Postema, to write 
that Bentham was among the first of a new 
and more elaborate kind of legal positivists: 
normative positivists.12 Normative positivism 
founds legal positivism on a normative justifi-
8 TUSSEAU, note 1, 137 
Literatur 
cation, be it utility or social coordination. Tus-
seau himself notes that "Bentham's constitu-
tional writings are deeply normative, thus in-
cluding the teleological aspect in the defini-
tion of what a constitution is."13 He observes, 
for instance, that in Bentham's account "con-
stitutional law is the branch of law which de-
termines, in the political community, the sub-
jects of the powers and duties attached to the 
exercize of superior normative functions and 
which sanctions this exercize on others in or-
der to ensure the greatest happiness of the 
greatest number."14 It is this normative aim 
inherent in Bentham's conception of constitu-
tionalism that is then reproduced in all the lay-
ers of the legal order, thus enabling the con-
stitution to play a unifying role.15 
The second interesting point addressed 
in Tusseau's book is the socially constructed 
rather than imperativist nature of the consti-
tution.16 With this conception Bentham steers 
clear of the consequences of absolute imper-
ativism that are often attached to legal posi-
tivism. Indeed, the people's own will is reflect-
ed in the constitution thanks to democratic 
procedures. But by avoiding the imperativist 
Charybdis, Bentham has not yet defeated the 
Scylla of natural law. He manages to do this 
by defining constitution-making as a social 
construction process that is both nourished 
by the need for social coordination as well as 
nourishing that need, ratherthan being bound 
by pre-constitutional duties to coordinate. In 
this sense, Bentham's constitutionalism can 
be compared to Hume's dialectical form of 
conventionalism. 
The originality of Bentham's concept of 
constitutionalism is revealed in Tusseau's 
9 J. BENTHAM, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, in: BURNS/HART (eds), 
London: University of London, The Althone Press 1970, p. 294 
10 TUSSEAU, note 1, 172, 279 
11 TUSSEAU, note 1, 25, 79 
12 See G. POSTEMA, Bentham and the Common Law Tradition, Oxford: Clarendon 1986, Ch. 9; J. 
WALDRON, Normative (ethical) legal positivism, in: J. COLEMAN (ed.), Hart's Postscript, Oxford: OUP 
2001, 41 Off. 
13 TUSSEAU' note 1, 143 
14 TussEAU, note 1, 143. Note, however, that the author decides on page 144 to expel the normative 
elements from that definition, although not very consistently since he refers to the 'purpose' of 
constitutional law on pages 147 and 172. He justifies this choice by reference to Bentham's legal 
positivism, but this argument ignores that Bentham's positivism is normatively justified,. 
15 TUSSEAU, note 1, 147 
16 TUSSEAU, note 1, 278 
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account of how the constitution sets lim-
its to the sovereign qua law. This was one of 
the difficulties faced by the legal theorists of 
his time such as John Austin. According to 
them, a constitution understood as law, i.e. 
the sovereign's commands, could not bind the 
sovereign himself. For Bentham, then, if the 
constitution was the result of pure imperativ-
ism, it would be hard to see how the people 
could bind itself; the law would be nothing else 
than what the representatives of the people 
imperatively said it is. If, however, the consti-
tution is also justified to them, and to what 
Bentham calls the 'Public Opinion Tribunal', 
as something that promotes their interest in 
17 TUSSEAU, note 1, 158, 191 
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stability and coordination, it is easier to see 
how the people can bind itself to follow the 
constitution qua principle of order of social 
reality .17 It is only in this way that citizens can 
both "obey constantly and resist freely", to 
quote Bentham. In this sense, Bentham's con-
stitutionalism is truly innovative; it has more 
in common with the Habermasian inter-sub-
jective justification of law's normativity than 
with the command theory of law en vogue at 
his time. 
Samantha Besson 
Dr. S. B., M. Jur., The Queen's College, Oxford 
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rik als Kunst, dieses zu beeinflussen, aus 
sich hervor. Die Autoren des vorliegenden 
Band es haben bei einer Tagung des ,,Ar· 
beitskreises Ideengeschichte der Rechtsphi-
losophie" diese Herausforderung angenom-
men und ihre andauernde Relevanz fiir die 
Begrilndung des Rech ts unter Beweis ge-
stellt. 
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